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金管局將於明年夏季推出一項相當有用�措施，mini storage就係安排流動車遊走港九新界收集十蚊或以下硬幣，市民可將硬幣換番紙幣或增值落八達通。可增值八達通近年唔少商戶為免拎一大堆銀仔去銀行入錢，被銀行收手續費，索性唔收毫子，加上?家搭車、買�多數用八達通，唔知大家會唔會同華華一樣，�屋企儲埋儲埋一桶桶毫子，一直唔知點處理呢？金管局總裁陳德霖可能有相同煩惱，迷你倉是度到呢條好橋。金管局明年夏天開始，就會利用大型貨車改裝成流動服務站，按時間表�港九、新界指定地點，包括屋苑同領匯（823）旗下商場停泊，同市民換硬幣。金管局會將收回�硬幣撥歸庫存，市場有需求就放出去，循環流通。截至舊年底，硬幣流通總值達到63億元，較五年前增加19%，當中以5蚊銀佔最多，有19億元，其次係2蚊，有15億元，10蚊有12億元。文件倉

「老吾老以及人之老」，儲存呢句說話係人都識講，可惜說易行難，尤其�香港，隨�人口不斷老化，老人問題愈演愈烈，港府束手無策，安老無計，一味小修小補，小恩小惠。呢，廣東計劃就係其中之一�。所謂廣東計劃，即係畀長期居住於廣東�香港長者毋須每年返港，亦可領取每月一千一百多元生果金。計劃籌備經年，尋日正式實施，好多老人家望穿秋水，終於等到呢一日。可惜，等得到亦未必好，而且隨時谷住道氣添�。本來呢，遲到好過冇到，有計劃好過冇計劃，每月千零蚊生果金雖然唔算多，但幫補�生計，總算聊勝於無。弊就弊在港產官僚做�甩甩漏漏，永遠唔識得為老人家�想，搞到計劃��實施就問題多多，怨聲四起。話說廣東計劃總共收到一萬三千幾宗申請，對於估計三萬幾名長住廣東�長者�講，都算幾踴躍�。問題係當局尋日開始約見已登記�長者，而每日名額只有八十個咁大把，換句話講，有�老人家可能要等八個月至可以獲得約見辦手續，你話係咪離譜�？雖然當局承諾補發等候期間�生果金�，但好多老人家風燭殘年，為�區區生果金，居然要同政府鬥長命，講起都可悲，當局究竟敬老定虐老�？仲有�，當局規定生果金需要透過銀self storage自動轉帳過戶，即係擺明為難老人家�。係人都知，好多移居內地�老人家冇本港銀行戶口，就算依家想開戶，亦因為缺乏本港住址證明而被拒絕，搞到無所適從。當局話喎，若長者無戶口或無法開戶，可透過香港親友�戶口代收，若長者�香港無親無故，當局會委託國際社會服務社作為轉介機構，將生果金發放畀長者。 唉，又代收又轉介，仲有冇麻煩��？點解當局唔諗辦法幫老人家開設戶口呢？唔通咁簡單�事都做唔到？所以話，港府眼高手低，志大才疏，好事都變成壞事喇。廣東計劃被吹到好似一項德政咁，其實除�廣東之外，亦有唔少長者移居內地其他省份，當局厚此薄彼，製造不公，咁又點算係德政�！講到底，廣東計劃只係敷衍民意�小恩小惠，相對於不斷惡化�老人問題，根本止唔到咳。�，本港三個長者就有一個貧窮，唔少人老無所依，老無所養，晚景淒涼，咪就係因為港府一味小修小補，缺乏完整�安老政策囉。計功夫茶話齋，要真正解決老人問題，唯一辦法就係盡快推行全民退休保障制度，只要人人得到保障，個個生活無憂，好多老人問題自然迎刃而解。前朝政府蹉跎歲月，漠視老人問題，現屆政府係時候撥亂反正�，千祈唔好再扮鴕鳥呀！迷利倉

The former expects to raise $32.自存倉1m from private placement and the latter $4.27mCORDLIFE Group and Artivision Technologies yesterday announced that they are raising funds via share placements.Cordlife has proposed a private placement of 26.8 million shares that is expected to raise gross proceeds of $33.5 million. After deducting fees and expenses, the group expects to raise net proceeds of $32.1 million.Cordlife, which runs a cord blood bank, intends to offer 17.8 million shares at $1.25 each via placement agent United Overseas Bank, while the remaining 9.038 million shares will be taken up by Caerus Capital and four other investors via subscription agreements.The issue price of $1.25 represents a discount of 4.8 per cent to the volume-weighted average price of $1.3137 per share for trades done on Sept 30.Of the net proceeds, $23.5 million will fund its expansion plans abroad, including investments, joint ventures, acquisitions or strategic alliances, while the rest will be used for general working capital purposemini storage. Last month, the group bought a 20 per cent stake in Malaysian cord blood banking company StemLife Berhad for $11.5 million.It called for a trading halt after noon on Tuesday, which was lifted after this announcement yesterday evening.Meanwhile, Artivision Technologies expects to raise net proceeds of $4.27 million from its proposed placement of 35.7 million new ordinary shares at 12.222 Singapore cents each.This price is a discount of 10 per cent from the volume-weighted average price of 13.58 Singapore cents per share for trades done on Sept 27.Artivision intends to use up to $3.5 million of the net proceeds to settle unpaid construction costs for the Thai factory of Colibri Assembly Thailand Co (CAT). It entered into a conditional sale and purchase agreement to acquire CAT last Thursday.The rest of the proceeds will be used for working capital requirements or future expansion and acquisition plans. Artivision called for a trading halt on Monday morning, which was lifted after its announcement yesterday evening.儲存

開門見山最近報上“表哥”、“房姐”的見報率奇高，存倉如果不仔細看報道的內容，望文生義，以為“表哥”是指舅舅、姨媽的兒子；“房姐”是稱姓房的女士。看了新聞的內容就知道，“表哥”是那個愛戴各種高檔手錶炫富的中國高官；“房姐”指那個被控用多個假戶口在北京買了很多套房子的富婆，她只是一個國家銀行地方小分行的行長，哪來那麼多錢買那麼多房子？“表哥”、“房姐”都是人們起的外號，此外，還有“虎父”、“虎媽”等外號，那是送給對幼兒進行嚴苛、高壓教育的父母。起這些外號，都是拿華文來“玩”，誰說華文枯燥乏味，不好“玩”？我在中國大陸、台灣、香港、馬來西亞走動，沒聽到人家說“華文很難學”，不好“玩”，但這些話在新加坡卻是經常聽到。其實，如果你會玩，華文是蠻好玩的。不需要懂得很深奧的華文，就是大白話也能玩出花樣來，讓人忍俊不禁。人的通病是：自己不會玩，就說不好玩。如吹笛子嗩吶，會玩的人玩得不亦樂乎，不會玩的人拼命吹都吹不響，就說“不好玩”。華文用起來可莊可諧，可以硬如花崗岩，也可以軟如棉花豆腐。說華文“有趣”“好玩”，當作一種引發學習興趣的策略是可以的，但是學習華文的目的不應是為了“玩”，而是為了更好地吸收中華文化的精髓。任何一種語文，其主要功能都不是給人玩的，所謂“玩”其實是指靈活運用，儲存加趣味，讓人開心。過於強調好玩，或者刻意讓華文變成“玩具”和遊戲，反而把學習語文的嚴肅性掩蓋了，以為學華文就為了好玩，殊不知世界上任何一種遊戲，無論多麼好玩，玩久必膩。學習語文難易的客觀條件是環境，具體地說是以下幾種需要：一、與人交流溝通的需要，二、謀生的需要（包括工作、經商等），三、求學的需要。沒聽日本人說日文難學，也沒聽中國人說中文（華文）難學，因為他們有學習日文、中文的客觀環境。以前我們學多種方言同時也學華語華文，並不覺得困難，反而覺得學英文很難。現在為什麼有些學生覺得華文難學？主要原因就是缺乏講華語和用華文的大環境（整個社會）與小環境（如家庭）。易學與難學不是絕對的。騎腳踏車和開汽車，哪一種難學哪一種容易學，不需要爭論，這兩種本領一高一低，也不需要爭論。人們是不是只滿足于騎腳踏車的本領，不想學開汽車了呢？原來是要求學會開汽車的，因為有人抱怨開汽車很難，於是就向他們讓步：好了好了，不必學開汽車了，學會騎腳踏車就好了。當有人連騎腳踏車也嫌難的時候，是不是可以對他們說：“好了好了，嫌難就不必學了，會走路就行了。”如果孩子連走路也懶得學，大人是不是還要再讓步？筆心如果你會玩，華文是蠻好玩的。不需要懂得很深奧的華文，就是大白話也能玩出花樣來，讓人忍俊不禁。——韓山元self storage

不少持卡人習慣將已經不再使用的信用卡閑置在某個角落，儲存或者在還未銷卡的情況下將其扔掉。殊不知，銷卡意味著用卡活動的停止，而未銷卡的情況下，持卡人隨意處置卡片容易泄露卡片信息，乃至被盜用。不僅如此，如今的免年費政策通常需要持卡人在一年內刷滿一定金額或筆數，若不銷卡又停用卡片，很可能因為達不到這些要求而被扣收年費。若未及時支付年費，還self storage能產生罰息，隱患頗多。信用卡銷卡也是有門道的，首先不能隨意丟棄要還沒銷卡的信用卡，而且，信用卡銷卡前也最好等到下個月賬單看到所有欠款是否都已徹底還清，再進行進一步的銷卡的手續辦理。不然就算銷卡了，賬戶信息還是存在，並有逾期利息等處理起來就會很麻煩。這裡就有一位客戶，信用卡銷卡時一不留神，銷卡後沒有徹底結清，產生了銷卡後利息。（全景）迷利倉

（砂拉越 詩巫3日訊）華裔女菜農今年5月起遭相信來自西馬的詐騙集團所騙，儲存指她在香港涉及洗黑錢逾千萬令吉和逃稅88萬港幣，導致她在4個月內竟瞞著家人匯了逾170萬令吉到指定銀行戶頭，還清遠在香港的“欠款”。前後63次匯錢受害婦女從最初接到詐騙集團的電話至上個月，完全沒有告知家人此事，以致她一次又一次跌落詐騙集團設下的陷阱。當家人知道她上當後，她已前後63次透過國內7家間銀行匯錢到詐騙集團指定的不同銀行戶頭，數目高達逾170萬令吉。五十餘歲的林姓受受害者今早在丈夫、妹妹和都東區州議員葉海量陪同下，向警方報案。案件目前轉交警方商業犯罪組調查。受害者今早提交給警方mini storage資料包括匯款記錄、銀行戶頭持有人姓名及兩份由詐騙集團傳真給受害者的文件。據知，至少有4人涉及詐騙，過去4個月內和受害者用電話聯絡的詐騙集團成員，分別以律師、稅務局局長、海關局局長和香港恆生銀行經理的假身份行騙。詐騙集團先指受害者在香港欠下88萬港幣的稅務，於5月9日早上10時傳真一份由香港特別行政區政府稅務局發出的機密文件給她，讓她誤信自己真的欠錢。受害者除了取出40萬令吉血汗錢，也向丈夫拿了逾30萬，同時也從和妹妹及堂妹聯名開的銀行保險箱取出逾7公斤重金飾，全部變賣後匯款給詐騙集團。受害者近期因詐騙集團不斷撥電話向她要錢，她擔心自己出事，才向丈夫透露此事。;self storage

【女文員跳樓亡】【本報訊】疑因工作壓力而跳樓身亡的東亞銀行女文員潘慧思（26歲），文件倉昨晨9時，其父母及胞兄等六人前往西環殮房認屍，逗留兩小時後離去，惟其父獨自離開，他指平日有與慧思通電話及飲茶，但愛女身後事由兒子全權負責，「我唔知呀，佢（兒子）負責晒。」另外，消息稱東亞銀行於慘劇發生後，昨日將案發大廈天台封鎖，以防再存倉同類事故發生。東亞銀行發言人稱，銀行除向死者家屬致以深切慰問外，亦主動轉介獨立專業人士向他們提供心理輔導，並提出可配合需要協助辦理後事；至於該大廈有否封鎖措施，乃物業管理公司的安排，銀行未能評論。前日下午1時許，慧思疑不堪工作壓力困擾及情緒病發，由灣仔東亞銀行港灣中心21樓分行廁所攀窗躍下，直墮4樓平台，當場身亡。 儲存

內地電訊業擬推新政壓中移（00941）一企獨大。據內地媒體引述市場消息指，儲存工信部正醞釀對三大運營商的牌照及網間結算費調整，預期將對中移收入與利潤結構影響最不利。美銀美林料新政若然落實，估計中移明年盈利將大削11%，並降投資評級至「跑輸大市」。三大電訊商昨日股價表現受消息影響，聯通（00762）及中電信（00728）股價昨日雙雙向上，收市分別升8.43%及7.57%，最受新政影響的中移股價則微跌0.68%，報86.5元。中電信發言人回覆查詢時指，並未聽聞任何通知。聯通昨日通告則指，未接獲有關部門關於對網間結算費調整的通知，亦不明股價升因。電訊商利潤結構失衡據《財經國家周刊》獲悉，工信部正醞釀平衡三大電訊商間利益的新政，除了下調聯通與中電信向中移支付的移動間結算標準，亦允許中移進入固定寬帶網絡市場作為補償。內地電訊商利潤結構失衡存在已久，以一二年為例，中移淨利潤1,293億元（人民幣?下同），聯通及中電信的淨利潤分別只有71億元self storage149.25億元，反映電訊商利潤結構極為失衡。按現行結算方式，三電訊商用戶撥打移動電話時，由撥出通話一方向接聽一方付費，費率統一為每分鐘0.06元。根據昨日報道指，工信部正計劃，未來中電信和聯通向中移付費進行結算時，費率標準下降至每分鐘0.03元，至於中移向聯通和中電信付費結算，則沿用現行標準不變。該報道估計，若新政落實，中移每年向聯通和中電信網間結算的支出，將增加超過每年120億元。料中移淨利潤少11%美銀美林報告指，估計一四年中移由聯通及中電信收取的移動網間結算收入達270億元，其中170億元來自聯通，100億元來自中電信。報告指，若中移的網間結算收費被減半，料其全年營業收入將會減少135億元，並預期削減淨利潤11%，投資評級降至「跑輸大市」，但新政卻帶動聯通及中電信明年的淨利潤分別上升42%及18%。政策調整主要集中兩方面1.允許中國移動進入固定寬帶網絡市場2.下調聯通與中電信向中移支付的移動—移動網間結算標準註：市場消息迷利倉

�指重上二萬三千點後，迷你倉下午在高位反覆，�指收市報23214.4，升229.92，成交532億元。美國政府關閉繼續困擾市場，歐美股市周三下跌，但早上公布的9月中國非製造業商務活動指數為55.4%，按月升1.5個百分點。港股高開182點，重上二萬三千點，早上最高見23241.5，升257點，是全日最高，下午繼續在高位徘徊，收市升幅為1%。長實(0001)報125元，升2.4元；和黃(0013)報96.85元，升0.9元；新地(0016)報105.7元，跌0.1元；文件倉古A(0019)報92.8元，升0.45元。匯控(0005)報84.35元，升0.2元；�生(0011)報127.3元，跌0.1元；建設銀行(0939)報6.06元，升0.08元；中銀香港(2388)報24.75元，跌0.05元；工行(1398)報5.5元，升0.04元。中移動(0941)報86.5元，跌0.6元；港交所(0388)報126.1元，升2.2元；中國人壽(2628)報20.6元，升0.55元；中石油(0857)報8.64元，升0.12元。(即時新聞)存倉

儲存 【本報訊】美國德州餐廳經理托伊斯，早前發現自己銀行存款高達四萬億美元（逾三十一萬億港元），使他成為全球首位萬億富豪，拋離全球首富、微軟公司主席蓋茨。托伊斯滿心歡喜，希望用該筆款項為國家清還國債，銀行其後發現他們更新資料時出錯，已迅速修正，令他夢想落空。mini storage

Monopoly status of China’s state-owned enterprises gives them enormous economic power, which makes them a political playground, analysts sayThroughout the course of human history, no two matters have been responsible for more conflicts than power and wealth.迷你倉最平 And nowhere are wealth and power more closely entwined than in one of China’s state-owned enterprises.For years, the SOEs have attracted the ire of consumers for taking advantage of their monopoly status by offering substandard products at an excessive price. They are equally scorned for paying lavish salaries and spending on luxury entertainment and generous perks for privileged staff, all of which goes hand-in-hand with widespread corruption because of the companies’ excessive profitability.In 2011, for instance, oil refining behemoth Sinopec raised hackles on the mainland when it was revealed that its Guangdong branch had splashed a fortune on huge quantities of expensive drinks, including Chateau Lafite Rothschild wine and national liquor mao-tai. The cost of the drinks came to some 1.68 million yuan (HK$2.12 million).A recent high-profile graft scandal involving a number of senior executives of the state oil and gas company with connections to the very top political leadership has strengthened the widely held belief that the state monopolies are not just a hive of corruption but also a battlefield for factional political conflict.The detention of Jiang Jiemin , head of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (Sasac), a government body set up in 2003 to oversee the giant SOEs, is seen as symptomatic of what some academics call “bureaucratic capitalism”.Jiang, a former head of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), became the first member of the Communist Party’s 205-strong Central Committee to be held for what Xinhua described as “serious discipline violations” – a euphemism for graft – since the leadership transition in November.The move is being presented by state media as evidence of a resolve to clean up public life under the new leadership of President Xi Jinping . But this is by no means the first high-level corruption case involving state monopolies.In 2009, former Sinopec Chen Tonghai was given a suspended death sentence after being convicted of taking 196 million yuan in bribes. The same year, Li Peiying , former president of the holding company for the Beijing Capital International Airport, was executed for taking bribes of 26.6 million yuan. The following year, Kang Rixin , former general manager of China National Nuclear Corp was sentenced to life in prison for taking 6.6 million yuan in bribes.This year, former railways minister Liu Zhijun was given a suspended death sentence for accepting bribes of more than 64 million yuan. He had served as chief executive of the China Railway Corp as part of his role in the ministry.Economists and political analysts believe monopoly status is the chief reason for widespread corruption in the state business sector.“These giant enterprises are often monopolies in their industries, and the monopoly status might have facilitated the corruption,” says Professor Xiaoyu Pu, a political scientist at the University of Nevada.Professor Jingdong Yuan, who teaches political science at the University of Sydney, says: “They are huge and they make huge profits due to their domestic monopolistic position.” .China’s SOEs, a legacy of the Mao era, have enjoyed rapid growth in the past decade as reform stalled under former president Hu Jintao and premier Wen Jiabao . The world’s second-largest economy is characterised by government-controlled giants that dominate major sectors. For instance, between them three state-controlled giants, China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom monopolise the telecommunications sector, while the petroleum and gas industry is dominated by CNPC, Sinopec and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), to name a few.In the 1990s, many such SOEs were struggling for survival in an increasingly open market, with none making it to the Fortune Global 500 list, a ranking of firms by revenue. But this year’s edition features more than 60 Chinese SOEs, including three in the top 10 list. Sinopec Group ranked fourth, CNPC fifth, and State Grid seventh among the world’sbiggest companies.Back in the 1990s, some two-thirds of SOEs were in the red. But by 2010, the combined profit of state giants CNPC and China Mobile was higher than the combined profit of the nation’s 500 largest private firms, according to government figures.Zhiqun Zhu, MacArthur Chair of East Asian Politics and director of the China Institute at Bucknell University, says that because of their profitability, SOEs often come under the control of people close, or even related, to high-ranking government officials.So-called princelings – the children of revolutionary leaders – and relatives of current leaders are known to dominate the boardrooms of many SOEs. Relatives of late leader Deng Xiaoping are believed to control the huge Poly Group, and the family of ex-president Jiang Zemin has moved into telecommunications.But the most prominent example of a princeling business dynasty is the family of former premier Li Peng , who himself is considered a princeling, having been adopted by popular premier Zhou Enlai , Mao Zedong ’s long-serving right-hand man.Li’s family controls the nation’s energy sector. Daughter Li Xiaolin is chairwoman of state-run electricity giant China Power International Development, and son Li Xiaopeng used to head Huaneng Power, another heavyweight, before being appointed vice-governor of Shanxi province.Analysts say the huge economic interests involved have made SOEs the scene of feroc儲存ous political infighting. They say the crackdown on the so-called “petroleum gang” is also targeting former security tsar Zhou Yongkang , who retired from the innermost Politburo Standing Committee during November’s power transition. Zhou, who rose through the ranks after working for CNPC, is seen as a key political patron of disgraced former Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai .Indeed, this is the largest shake-up of the petroleum sector in the last two decades, with four top CNPC executives, including Zhou’s associates, being detained and more than 250 mid-level executives summoned to help in the investigation.Nevada academic Pu says factional politics is often at the root of corruption investigations, especially in cases linked to senior politicians. “This time might be the same, although Zhou has an unusual status,” he says.Professor Steve Tsang, director of the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, says: “This is not so much about anti-corruption as about power politics.”Professor Dali Yang, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, says the recent purges of Zhou’s followers show that his wings are being clipped and clout weakened.Analysts say that, in a system of one-party rule that puts business under a unified, party-led management structure, a lack of public oversight means corrupt activity carries few risks for officials – unless they end up on the wrong side of a power struggle.“The relationship between enterprises and government is complicated. Many executives of these enterprises are powerful officials with wide political connections, and they are not entrepreneurs. There is lack of appropriate accountability and supervision,” Pu says.Collective corruption is not unique to CNPC. Outsiders have long struggled to get a handle on the executives who control trillions of US dollars in assets while enjoying the same political status and privileges associated with their peers in the party, military and government organs.Many senior executives in the top 100 companies – the ones that fall under the umbrella of Sasac – have long enjoyed a status on a par with a vice-minister or vice-governor, with a handful of very senior executives considered equal to a minister or governor.The executives have also acquired seats either as full members or alternates on the Communist Party’s Central Committee, or as delegates to the ceremonial legislature – the National People’s Congress – or top advisory body the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.Their real bosses, as their peers in party and government organs, are the Central Committee’s Organisation Department, and they are regulated by internal rules set by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.“At issue is the fact there is no really effective supervisory institution in China that can independently monitor companies and enforce rules with sufficient authority and without interference or retribution should their investigations lead to so-called big tigers,” says the University of Sydney’s Yuan.Ho Wing-chung, associate professor of sociology at the City University of Hong Kong, says money has emerged as a source of political power in today’s China. “Under a system I call ‘bureaucratic capitalism’, struggles in the business field reflect struggles in the political field,” he says.The University of Chicago’s Yang says the SOEs represent not only the commanding heights of China’s political economy, but are also natural playgrounds for political patronage. They have also often evolved into complex, far-flung conglomerates with intricate networks of subsidiaries not subject to tight monitoring.“They are therefore great vehicles for discretion by the corporate leaders, who often have a relatively short time horizon while at the helm,” Yang says.Some analysts view the recent crackdown as part of an SOE reform drive being pursued by reformist Premier Li Keqiang . The widening investigation into corruption linked to the oil sector has raised hopes that it could be the trigger for a reduction in the role of the SOEs. Economists say state monopolies’ control of market power in strategic economic sectors is an obstacle to sustainable growth that should be scrapped to give the private sector a greater role.Yuan believes Beijing’s new, no-nonsense anti-graft tsar Wang Qishan is clearly up to something, and that there will be more rigorous and routine monitoring of people in leadership positions. “You don’t see a lot of fanfare … but things are happening and this may be a good sign,” he says.Scott Kennedy, director of the Research Centre for Chinese Politics & Business at Indiana University, believes the leadership under Xi and Li will pursue serious economic reforms, including SOE reform and liberalisation of the service sector.“They’ve expanded implementation of the anti-monopoly law, anti-corruption, environmental protection, and other areas. Some of this has led to CNPC being targeted, and in other cases, [other] SOEs,” Kennedy says. “This makes me more optimistic about what may come out of the third plenum in November,” he added, referring to the Central Committee’s third plenum, meeting, an occasion associated in the past with key economic announcements.But Bucknell University’s Zhu believes the leadership is unlikely to start radical reforms in the near future. “Even if Xi and Li are determined to do so, they’ll need to consolidate power first before initiating those reforms,” he says.Ho, the City University academic, is not optimistic either. “China’s bureaucratic capitalism portrays a pessimistic picture for China’s real political reform, which implies that its economic reform is and will be very difficult, if not impossible,” he says.mini storage

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